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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Energy Law, Business, 
Regulation and Policy at the International Hellenic University.  
This Dissertation assesses the impact on investment arbitration in the energy 
sector derived from the decision of the Court of Justice of European Union in the 
Slovak Republic v. Achmea B.V. (Case C-284/16), generally known as the Achmea 
Judgment. The fundamental outcome of the decision was to invalidate, as 
incompatible with EU law, the arbitration provisions known as Investor – State Dispute 
Settlement (‘ISDS’) clauses in more than 200 intra – EU Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(‘BITs’). From the initial seismic tremors within the arbitration community, the Achmea 
Judgment eventually led to the European Commission and almost all 28 Member 
States declaring the Termination of all intra-EU BITs. 
This paper begins with a brief but essential analysis of the facts of the Achmea 
Judgment, followed by a short overview of the history of intra-EU BITs. The focus of 
the dissertation then is to proceed to scrutinize the ramifications of this decision, 
through an assessment of specific case law that followed. The analysis will then 
proceed to assess the role assumed by the European Commission, and how it 
capitalized on the uncertainty the Achmea Judgment cast on the validity of this 
particularly treaty subset in order to achieve the twin goals of (a) proactively 
terminating all existing intra-EU BITs and (b) reforming and unifying the investment 
protection system within the European Union. 
Finally, this dissertation seeks to assess the possible alternatives to the Investor 
– State Dispute Settlement system, both those that currently exist and others, like the 
Investment Court System, the formation of which are currently under discussion. 
 
Keywords: #intra-EU BITs, #Achmea, #ISDS, #investment protection, #termination 
Ligeia Zachariadi - Mylopoulou 
Thessaloniki, 6 January 2020 
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Introduction 
In April 2018, the Court of Justice of European Union rendered a landmark 
decision. The famous Achmea case, Case C-284/16, came and shook the waters. This 
dissertation aims to analyse how the scenery of investment protection shifted from that 
point on forward. 
This dissertation is divided in five chapters, which follow a chronological 
sequence of the events that took place after the publication of the aforementioned 
ruling. The first section delineates the factual background of the case and outlines the 
course of the arbitration, the appeals, and the path to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union in order to give a context for the ruling, which delivered a shock to the 
arbitration community. The second section provides a brief historical analysis for the 
reasons for the development of the institution of Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
offers some statistical data to underscore the significance of investment arbitration 
clauses, particularly in the energy sector. The third section assesses the immediate 
consequences of the Achmea Judgment and examines specific cases to highlight how 
state actors, as respondents in arbitration proceedings, sought to take advantage of this 
ruling, and how the arbitral tribunals reacted to this effort. The fourth chapter is entirely 
dedicated to the role of the major tactical player in the newly declared war on intra-EU 
Bilateral Treaties, and specifically against the Investor–State Dispute Settlement 
provisions found therein -- that is, the European Commission. This section will analyse 
how the European Commission inserted itself in arbitration proceedings as amicus 
curiae and how it managed to persuade all EU member states to pre-emptively 
terminate their intra – EU Bilateral Treaties. The Final section discusses the efforts of the 
European Commission to scramble for solutions in the wake of these terminations, as 
well as a brief assessment of these solutions. 
The energy sector is a dynamic business development area where major non-
state businesses make vast, long-term investments, which entail considerable risks. 
Among the risks these investors long believed that they had minimized was the fear of 
mistreatment by the nations where their investments were made, thanks to the 
confidence they placed in the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) concluded between 
their home states and the states (‘Host States’) where the physical investment would 
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take place. More specifically, the investor corporations relied on the provisions of these 
treaties that allowed them to directly initiate arbitral proceedings against any Host State 
that would try to breach their rights – that is, the Investor–State Dispute Settlement 
(‘ISDS’) provisions. These ISDS provisions were a crucial part of the BITs, since they 
offered investor corporations a legal route to shield1 their investments against any 
measures later implemented by or on behalf of the Host States that might invalidate 
their agreements. Some attractive features of these provisions and the systems they 
established were the neutral ground they provided, the choice of arbitrators based on 
the parties’ needs, the efficiency of the arbitral tribunals, and a structured enforcement 
procedure to ensure the swift fulfilment of obligations incurred as a result of the 
tribunals’ awards. 
While ironically the facts of the case had nothing to do with the energy sector, 
the effect of the Achmea Judgment was to cast doubt on the validity of all intra-EU BITs, 
and therefore on the ISDS provisions and arbitration framework contained therein. 
Corporations that had made huge, long-term investments in reliance on this framework 
have now been deprived of their comfort zone, and the repercussions of this for the 
energy sector within the European Union remain to be seen.  
The Achmea Case 
This chapter aims to give the reader a factual background of the Achmea Case. It 
is important to see, how this case was formed and how it reached the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, which rendered the landmark decision.  
Factual Background  
In 1991, the Kingdom of Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federative 
Republic concluded a Bilateral Investment Treaty (‘BIT’), which was entered into force 
on 1th of October 2002.2 The Slovak Republic acceded the European Union on May 1, 
2004.3 After the accession of the Slovak Republic into the European Union, this ‘BIT’ 
assumed the status of an intra – EU BIT. Subsequent to its accession, the Slovak Republic 
                                                 
1 Charris-Benedetti, Juan Pablo. ‘The proposed Investment Court System: does it really solve the 
problems?’ (2019) 42 Revista Derecho del Estado 83, 83-84 
2 Countries, European Union <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-
countries/slovakia_en> accessed 30 November 2019 
3 Countries, European Union <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-
countries/slovakia_en> accessed 30 November 2019 
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decided to reform its health system.4 Part of the reform involved the liberalization of the 
health care insurance market, whereby private health insurers from the Slovak Republic 
and other EU member states were authorized to perform business activities subject to 
the regulation of the Slovak Health Surveillance Authority (‘HSA’).5 HSA was an 
independent regulatory authority which issued operation licenses and was in charge of 
determining whether the authorized companies were operating in compliance with the 
applicable regulations. Achmea BV, a company that was registered and incorporated in 
the Netherlands, decided to invest in Slovakia in February 2006. Accordingly, Achmea BV 
acquired the necessary license and incorporated a local company, in March 2006, into 
which it invested, as claimed, €72 million through cash capital contributions.6 In summer 
2006, a new government was formed in the Slovak Republic and introduced a number of 
measures that affected the private health insurers. Achmea BV claimed that the changes 
constituted serious violations of the terms of the 2002 BIT.7 In particular, Achmea BV 
alleged that the new measures constituted a breach of Articles 3 (non - discrimination 
measures), 4 (free transfer of profits) and 5 (unlawful indirect expropriation prohibition) 
of the BIT.8 
According to Article 8, para. 2 of the BIT, “Each Contracting Party hereby 
consents to submit a dispute referred to in paragraph (1) of this Article, to an arbitral 
tribunal, if the dispute has not been settled amicably within a period of six months from 
the date either party to the dispute requested amicable settlement.”9 Accordingly, 
Achmea BV (Claimant) initiated arbitral proceedings against the Slovak Republic 
(Respondent) on the basis of violation of the BIT and the standard protections it offers.10 
The first interlocutory-interim award, which examined jurisdiction, arbitrability 
and suspension was rendered on 26 October 2010,11 in response to the respondent’s 
                                                 
4 Case C-284/16, Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v Achmea BV, [2018], para 7 
5 Achmea BV v Slovak Republic, (Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [2010] PCA Case No. 2013-12, 
para 35  
6 Ibid 35-36  
7 Ibid 39-40  
8 Ibid 7  
9 Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (signed on 29 April 1991, entered into force 1 
October 1992), art 8, para 2,  
10 Ibid (n 5) 6-7  
11 Ibid (n 5) 
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assertion of lack of jurisdiction, which was based on the fact that the Slovak Republic is a 
member of the European Union and thus intra-EU investment treaties were displaced by 
the application of EU law.12 The arbitral tribunal dismissed the intra-EU Jurisdictional 
Objection.13 The tribunal went on to render its judgment on the merits on 7 December 
2012,14 according to which €22,1 million in damages were awarded to Achmea BV, to be 
paid by the Slovak Republic.15  
The Slovak Republic, as expected, initiated set–aside proceedings against the 
aforementioned award. Since the seat of the arbitration was in Frankfurt am Main, 
pursuant to German Civil Procedure Law (‘ZPO’),16 the Slovak Republic applied before 
the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt (‘OLG Frankfurt’) am Main.17 The Applicant 
argued that the award should be annulled because it was contrary to ordre public.18 In 
particular, the applicant based its argument on paragraph 1059 ZPO, which states that 
“(2) An arbitration award may be reversed only if: 2. The court determines that a) the 
subject matter of the dispute is not eligible for arbitration under German law b) The 
recognition or enforcement of the arbitration award will lead to a result contrary to 
public order”.19 Pursuant to the German Civil Procedure Law (‘ZPO’), the Slovak Republic 
applied before the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt (‘OLG Frankfurt’) am Main20. The 
applicant argued that the inability of the arbitral tribunal to address the Court of Justice 
of European Union (‘ECJ’), under article 267 of the Treaty of Function of the European 
Union (‘TFEU’)21 constituted an objection to the recognition or enforcement of arbitral 
awards rendered under these circumstances. The OLG Frankfurt rejected the application 
and dismissed the action, emphasizing, that parties to arbitration are sufficiently 
protected, since they have the opportunity to appeal to national courts, following the 
                                                 
12 Ibid (n 5) 9  
13 Ibid (n 5) 293  
14 Achmea BV v The Slovak Republic, (Award 2012), PCA Case No. 2008-13  
15 Ibid 333  
16 Zivilprozessordnung  
17 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt 
18 “Public policy is defined differently in different jurisdictions, but in most, an award could be vacated if it 
was not consistent with fundamental notions of justice, honesty, and fairness.” Margaret L. Moses, The 
Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, (Cambridge University Press 2012) 196  
19 Code of Civil Procedure as promulgated on 5 December 2005 [Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl., Federal Law 
Gazette) I page 3202; 2006 I page 431; 2007 I page 1781], last amended by Article 1 of the Act dated 10 
October 2013 (Federal Law Gazette I page 3786 
20 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt 
21 Consolidated Version of the Treat of Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47  
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rendering of the award, and through them address the ECJ’s ruling on interpretation.22 
Naturally, the Slovak Republic appealed dismissal before the German Federal Court of 
Justice (‘BGH)23, which stayed the proceedings and referred to ECJ through the 
preliminary reference procedure. The main question to be answered was whether the 
ISDS provision included in the intra–EU BIT in question was compatible or not with 
European Union Law. In particular, the referring court asked the ECJ whether Articles 
344, 267 and 18 of the TFEU preclude the application of the arbitration clause in Article 
8 of the BIT.24 The long awaited judgment came from the Grand Chamber of the ECJ on 
6 March 2018. 
The ECJ Ruling, the Beginning of the End 
In its ruling in Case C- 284/16,25 the ECJ ruled that arbitration clauses such as 
those included in the contended BIT between the Netherlands and the former 
Czechoslovakia are incompatible with the EU law. This ground-breaking ruling has 
already, in a short period of time, led to a number of developments.  
The ECJ ruled that Article 344 of the TFEU enshrines the principle of the 
autonomy of the EU legal system, and that an international agreement cannot alter the 
allocation of powers fixed by foundational EU Treaties. Under Article 344, Member 
States cannot submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for in the European 
Treaties.26  
Furthermore, according to the ECJ, the primacy of EU Law over the laws of the 
Member States, in combination with the direct effect of a number of European Law 
                                                 
22 OLG Frankfurt am Main, 26 Sch 3/13, Ruling, [18 December 2014] 
23 Bundesgerichtshof 
24 The BGH (in Ruling 3.3.2016 – ZB 2/15 – Slowakische REpublik v. Achmea), questions: 1. Steht Art.344 
AEUV der Anwendung einer Regelung in einem bilateralen Investitionsschutzabkommen zwischen 
Mitgliedstaaten der Union (einem sogenannten unionsinternen BIT) entgegen, nach der ein Investor eines 
Vertragsstaats bei einer Streitigkeit über Investitionen in dem anderen Vertragsstaat gegen letzteren ein 
Verfahren vor einem Schiedsgericht einleiten darf, wenn das Investitionsschutzabkommen vor dem 
Beitritt eines der Vertragsstaaten zur Union abgeschlossen worden ist, das Schiedsgerichtsverfahren aber 
erst danach eingeleitet werden soll? Falls Frage 1 zu verneinen ist: 2.Steht Art.267 AEUV der Anwendung 
einer solchen Regelung entgegen? Falls die Fragen 1 und 2 zu verneinen sind: Steht Art. 18 Abs. 1 AEUV 
unter den in Frage 1 beschriebenen Umständen der Anwendung einer solchen Regelung entgegen? 
<http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=pm&Datum=2
016&Sort=3&nr=74612&linked=bes&Blank=1&file=dokument.pdf> 
25 Case C-284/16, Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v Achmea BV, [2018]  
26 Ibid 49 
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provisions have led to “mutually interdependent legal relations binding the EU and its 
member States reciprocally and binding its Member States to each other”.27 In other 
words, the EU Treaties have established a judicial system, under which, according to 
Article 19 of the TFEU, the sole authorities competent to ensure the full application of 
EU law as well as the judicial protection of the rights of individuals under that law are 
the national courts and the ECJ. These twin systems further ensure consistency and 
uniformity in the interpretation of EU law.28 The ECJ went on to underline the essential 
significance of the preliminary reference mechanism set forth in Article 267 TFEU, which 
exists to facilitate dialogue between the courts with the ultimate goal of ensuring the 
uniform interpretation of EU law. The ECJ concluded that this provision must be 
interpreted so as to preclude the establishment of an arbitral tribunal, as such under 
article 8 of the BIT, since the arbitral tribunal cannot consider part of the EU judicial 
system. 
On 31 December 2018, the BGH implemented the aforementioned ruling of the 
ECJ and vacated the award. On top of that, the BGH did not allow an appeal to the 
German Constitutional Court, making the annulment of the award final.29 
It is important to mention, the existence of the dissenting opinion of Advocate 
General Wathelet (“A.G. Wathelet”, the “Wathelet Opinion”).30 This non – binding 
opinion outlines its author’s complete disagreement with key findings in the ECJ’s 
judgment. The Wathelet Opinion found that the ISDS provision found in intra-EU BITs is 
in fact compatible with EU law. In particular, it notes ‘Articles 18, 267 and 344 TFEU 
must be interpreted as not precluding the application of an investor/State dispute 
settlement mechanism established by means of a bilateral investment agreement 
concluded before the accession of one of the Contracting States to the European Union 
and providing that an investor from one Contracting State may, in the case of a dispute 
relating to investments in the other Contracting State, bring proceedings against the 
                                                 
27 Ibid 33 
28 Ibid 34-36 
29 BGH Decision of 31.10.2018 – I ZB 2/15 
30 Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘According to Advocate General Wathelet, the arbitration clause 
in the investment protection agreement concluded between the Netherlands and Slovakia is compatible 
with EU law’ No 101/17, Luxemburg, 19 September 2017 
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latter State before an arbitral tribunal’.31 A.G. Wathelet stated clearly that arbitral 
tribunals should be considered a court or a tribunal for the purposes of Article 267 of 
the TFEU and reminded that the ECJ had issued in the past preliminary rulings upon the 
request of arbitral tribunals.32 As presented in the ruling, the ECJ completely disregarded 
the Wathelet Opinion.  
In order to understand the extent of the impact of the reasoning in the Achmea 
Case, one needs to understand the concept of Bilateral Treaties and the ISDS provisions 
included.  
Bilateral Treaties 
This chapter aims to provide essential background information respecting 
Bilateral Treaties, starting from the fact of and reason for their inception, and the 
importance of the ISDS provisions for investment in the energy sector. 
A Brief History Analysis 
Bilateral Commercial Treaties have existed for quite a long time, but until the 
1950s they were more focused on facilitating trade than investment.33 Bilateral 
Investment Treaties constitute a post World War II development, whereby the massive 
international movement of capital occurred through foreign investment, initiated by the 
United States and later joined by Europe, Japan and other nations. Foreign investment 
grew steadily and by 1994 exceeded $200 billion,34 greatly facilitated by the 
promulgation of BITs. While individual BITs show some variation, their common 
characteristic is the guarantees they offer to investors, through provisions that address 
national treatment, most - favoured nation treatment (‘MFN’), prohibition of unlawful 
expropriation35 and fair and equitable treatment (‘FET’). The protection provided by BITs 
derives, at its most part, from customary law and treaties of Friendship, Commerce and 
                                                 
31 Ibid 273 
32 Ibid 84-131  
33 Jeswald W. Salacuse, ‘Chapter 14. The Energy Charter and Bilateral Investment Treaty Regimes’, in 
Thomas W. Wälde (ed), The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West Gateway for Investment and Trade 
(Kluwer Law International 1996) 321, 321 
34 Thomas W. Wälde, The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-West Gateway for Investment & Trade, (1st Edn, 
Kluwer Law International 1996) 324 
35 i.e. without a full compensation 
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Navigation.36 Under customary law, host states where obliged to treat investors’ with an 
international minimum standard, protection that was eventually regarded as inadequate 
when it came to the actual protection of the substantive rights of the investors’.37  
In 2017, according to the findings of Nicolas de Sadeleer, 2,396 Bilateral 
Investment treaties were in force.38 In the following two years, 59 BITs were terminated, 
leaving 2,337 BITs currently in force.39 The first BIT was concluded in 1959 between 
West Germany and Pakistan.40 West Germany, which was still recovering from partition, 
the aftermath of WWII and the loss of its investments abroad, was quite fragile when it 
came to political risks exposure.41 During that early period, BITs were concluded 
primarily between a developed country (typically a capital exporting country) and a 
developing one (typically a capital importing country).42 Developing nations, seeking to 
finance development, frequently had no better viable options but to pursue private 
foreign investment. BITs offered an incentive to investors by providing more substantial 
legal protection and guarantees for the investors than those provided by the national 
law of the host state and would therefore reduce risks to the point of inducing foreign 
investors to invest in the developing countries.43 Intra–EU BITs became an accidental 
“attraction” after the enlargement of the European Union in 2000 and in particular after 
2004, with the accession of eight post-communist countries from  Central and Eastern 
Europe, followed by the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Croatia in 
2013.44 In the era prior to their accession and more specifically during the 1990s, these 
countries, in the course of their political and socio-economic alteration, in order to 
                                                 
36 Thomas Roe and Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy Charter 
Treaty’, (1st Edn, Cambridge University Press 2011) p.5 
37 Ian Bronwlie, Principles of Public International Law (1st published 1966, Oxford University Press 1998) 
527-528. According to Brownlie, some states dispute the existence of this standard. 
38 Nicolas de Sadeleer, ‘The End of the Game: The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order Opposes Arbitral 
Tribunals under Bilateral Investment Treaties Concluded between Two Member States’,(2018) 9 (2) 
European Journal of Risk Regulation 355, 355 
39 International Agreements, UNCTAD Investment Hub 
<https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements> accessed 3 December 2019 
40 Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (with Protocol and exchange of notes), 
(adopted 25 November 1959, entered into force 28 November 1962), 457 UNTS 24 
41 Jeswald W Salacuse & Sullivan, ‘Do BITs really work?: An evaluation of bilateral investment treaties and 
their grand bargain’. (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 67 87  
42 ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1959-1999’ UNCTAD, (2000)  
43 Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements.’ (2005) 12 (1) U.C. 
Davis Journal of International Law & Policy, 171  
44 List of Countries, European Union <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en> 
accessed 3 December 2019 
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attract investors and thus foreign capital concluded a number of BITs with a number of 
developed countries, including some original EU member states.45 Thereafter, they also 
concluded BITs amongst themselves. These BITs, following the accession of the former 
Communist states to the EU, attained the status of intra-EU BITs; as of 2016, there were 
more than 200 such BITs in existence. 46 
The BIT concluded in 1969 between Italy and Chad was the first one that 
introduced the ISDS mechanism, i.e. to bring a case before an independent international 
arbitral tribunal.47 Its introduction was prompted by the establishment of International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes in 1965 (‘ICSID”) Convention.48 It was 
considered an innovative provision, because in essence, it served to depoliticize 
investment disputes, since it removed disputes from the political sphere and rendered 
them legal matters to be decided by a neutral authority.49  
In practice, ISDS provision came to serve a dual purpose. Arbitration proceedings 
rendered substantial awards in favour of the investors, the most characteristic case 
being the Yukos Case.50 Based on this pattern, investors would use the ISDS provisions in 
the BIT as leverage in dispute negotiations with the host state; until recently, the ISDS 
provisions of the BITs constituted the most important instrument to confer extensive 
substantive protection on investors.51 Another significant factor in the appeal of ISDS 
provisions stemmed from the perception that the local legal framework did not 
constitute a fair or neutral option. The assurance that disputes would be resolved by a 
neutral arbitral tribunal gave investors security against the prospect of legal action in 
the domestic courts of the host country, where they would not only be faced with an 
unfamiliar legal framework but also the possibility of discriminatory behaviour within 
the courts.  
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BITs and Arbitration in the Energy Sector 
One of the main sectors of international investment is the energy sector. The 
area of energy is a dynamic industry, especially throughout the European Union. Given 
the size and immovability of investments in this sector, it follows that energy investors 
should seek the highest protection possible, in order to secure their investment and to 
ensure that any breach of their rights as investors will be fairly adjudicated. It naturally 
follows that energy investors place a very high value on BITs containing ISDS provisions 
in order to reduce the risks of investing in developing host countries. 
Some Useful Statistics 
Foreign Direct Investment (‘FDI’) in the Energy Sector includes major capital – 
demanding projects. For example, the cost of construction of gas pipelines in USA can 
reach the amount of $1,5 million per mile.52 Any company that wants to be considered a 
major game player in the energy sector must invest on capital – intensive projects. Large 
scale projects like the development and maintenance of a power plant or the 
construction of long distance oil and gas pipelines thus impose a considerable risk on 
the investor, a risk that can be compounded by uncertainty with respect to the political 
or legal regime in the host country. The ISDS provisions have become standard in BITs in 
order to provide the dispute resolution mechanism independent of the courts of the 
host country and are critical to the final decision of the investor to proceed with their 
project. The practical outcome has shown that an increase in FDI is followed by an 
increase in the number of investment arbitrations as well. It is significant to note that, 
according to the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’) 
Web Statistics, Annual Report of 2019, Issue 1 and 2, which was recently published, 41% 
of all ICSID Arbitrations that have taken place relate to energy.53  
 The most fascinating thing, though, is that in 2019, based on the data provided 
by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (‘UNCTAD’) Investment 
Dispute Navigator, out of 31 investment arbitrations concluded between January 2019 
and July 2019, 22 arose out of the ISDS provisions of the BIT between the country of the 
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investor (home state) and the host state.54 This is confirmed by data from the ICSID Web 
Statistics, Annual Report of 2019, Issue 1 and 2, as shown below, which shows that 60% 
of the arbitrations arose from provisions contained within an applicable BIT.  
 
 
The first diagram refers to the caseload covered from 31 December 2019 to 29 June 2019 
and the second diagram refers to the caseload covered as of 30 June 2019. 
It is therefore evident, based on the foregoing data, that a majority of investors 
depend on BITs and the ISDS provisions thereof to protect their interests. The 
establishment of a favourable investment climate was perceived as a cornerstone of 
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economic development55 and BITs by establishing this legal stability, due process and 
adequate protection for the investors, contributed immensely in the economic 
development.  
Not only have ISDS provisions been accepted as the appropriate pathway for 
dispute resolution, but it is also important to note that, historically, most State parties 
have accepted the judgments of the arbitral tribunals and have complied with the 
awards of their own volition.56 However, the Achmea Judgment cast this environment of 
acceptance and compliance in doubt. The consequences of the ruling begin with the 
significance of the famous Achmea Objection and thereafter escalated to the point of 
the Declaration of Termination of intra EU BITs. This chapter is devoted to a systemic 
review of the evolution of the legal climate in the post Achmea era. 
The Consequences of the Achmea Case 
This chapter aims to explore how the ECJ ruling was received as a heaven sent 
weapon by the parties acting as respondents in the certain significant cases and how the 
arbitral tribunals established in these cases decided to act as if the pre – Achmea era 
was still alive. 
First Reactions, the Achmea Objection 
The initial decision by the OLG Frankfurt,57 dismissing the action of the Slovak 
Republic as outlined above, was perceived as a decisive victory for investment 
arbitration in the European Union. It was supposed to fortify the efficiency of the 
parties’ will embodied in arbitration clauses58 and further was supposed to provide 
clarification to the practical problem of how to navigate the friction that existed 
between the need to respect the EU treaty obligations for the Member States and the 
pre-existing framework for international investment protection. The decision 
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temporarily strengthened the autonomy of arbitration agreements by clarifying that, 
while the ECJ is the ultimate and final authority regarding the interpretation of 
European Union Law, it is not the only one. The decision clearly sought to avoid 
accepting the arguments of the claimant, the Slovak Republic. Had its arguments 
prevailed, arbitral tribunals would be summarily stripped of jurisdiction whenever 
confronted with the interpretation and application of European Union Law.  
As the case proceeded, it became clear that OLG Frankfurt only succeeded in 
postponing the inevitable. It was already common knowledge that the investment treaty 
arbitration system (‘ITA’) was not enthusiastically welcomed by the European Union,59 
but nobody had foreseen the ground-breaking decision issued by the ultimate and final 
court, the ECJ. Now, the investment arbitration community in the EU was confronted 
with the crucial question: does Achmea apply to all such arbitration proceedings? As it is 
known, the preliminary question mechanism is designed to facilitate dialogue between 
the national courts of the member states and the ECJ as far as the interpretation and 
the application of EU Law is concerned. The existence of this mechanism aims to the 
uniform application of EU Law throughout the European Union. The preliminary ruling 
has binding force over the two parties and the object of the dispute.60 Yet, there seems 
to be a de facto precedent set by ECJ case law and such it was unclear whether it was 
applicable to other cases with similar facts.  
The Achmea decision imposes a twofold risk, namely on the pending arbitrations 
and on future arbitrations that might take place in the European Union. A subsequent 
movement, which arose after the Achmea Ruling, was the “Achmea Objection”. The 
wording used in the award, in particular “tribunals such as that […]”,61 was received as 
affecting not only the specific parties in the Achmea Case, but also, every other arbitral 
tribunal that assumed jurisdiction based on an ISDS provision found in an intra-EU BIT. 
As such, respondents from other ongoing investment arbitration proceedings would 
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bring forth objections, as to the jurisdiction of the respective arbitral tribunal, which 
were accompanied from the Achmea Ruling.  
The Achmea Objection raised to intra – EU ECT Arbitration Proceedings, overruled 
One of the main areas where the aforementioned objection appeared was in 
arbitration proceedings initiated under the Energy Charter Treaty ‘ECT’. Before 
examining the key cases where this phenomenon took place, reference should be made 
once more to the face of A.G. Wathelet. As mentioned earlier A. G Wathelet expressed 
an opinion regarding arbitral tribunals and EU law in the Achmea Case.62 He also decided 
to express his understanding regarding the Energy Charter Treaty and the ISDS 
provision, where among others he also stated that, Energy Charter Treaty is a 
multilateral treaty where all the Contracting States participate on equal terms and thus 
all substantial provisions as well as the ISDS mechanism provided for in the Treaty 
operate between member states. On top of that, he added no EU institution and no 
member state had questioned the compatibility of the ECT with the EU Treaties and EU 
law.63 As it will be demonstrated below, it seems that in most of the cases arising out of 
the ECT, the arbitral tribunals shared the same understanding with the Advocate 
General.  
A solid example of the above Achmea Objection appearance is the Masdar Solar 
& Wind Cooperatief U.A. v. The Kingdom of Spain.64 The proceedings commenced 
pursuant to Article 26 (3) (a) of the ECT, which provides the ISDS mechanism. The 
arbitral tribunal found a breach of the FET standard under Article 10 (1) of the ECT and 
in its final award, rendered on 16 May 2018, ordered Spain to pay the amount of €64,5 
million in damages.65 The Respondent (Spain) raised an objection to lack of jurisdiction 
based on the Achmea Ruling claiming since the Tribunal had to interpret and apply EU 
Law, and since this Tribunal was not considered a part of the EU judicial system, it did 
not have the requisite competence to request a preliminary ruling under the mechanism 
provided in Article 267 TFEU, and therefore the arbitration award breached the 
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autonomy and the primacy of EU Law.66 The tribunal, however, rejected the 
aforementioned objection asserting that, the Achmea Case pertains only to BITs 
concluded between EU Member – States, since the ECJ’s decision made no reference to 
ISDS clauses found in multilateral treaties, such as the ECT. This was the first award 
rendered, after the Achmea Ruling, by an ECT tribunal.67 The Masdar Solar & Wind 
Cooperatief U.A. v. The Kingdom of Spain Case thus became a determinative case for a 
number of arbitral decisions upon jurisdiction that followed.  
In the case of Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 S. Á.R1., et al. v. Kingdom of Spain,68 
the Claimants initiated arbitral proceedings under the ISDS provisions of the ECT against 
Spain (Respondent). Spain, in an attempt to address its increasing tariff deficit, had 
passed legislative and regulatory measures, which the Claimants asserted, breached the 
‘FET’ principle under ECT Article 10 (1). The arbitral tribunal rendered an award dated 14 
November 2018, whereby it ordered Spain to pay the claimants 39 million in damages. 
During the arbitration proceedings, Spain raised an objection on the lack of jurisdiction 
of the arbitral tribunal over the dispute by bringing forth the Achmea Ruling of the ECJ 
as completely applicable to the specific case and as such, the objection should be 
“sustained”.69 The arbitral tribunal proceeded with “overruling” the objection,70 
invoking the Masdar Ruling and the Opinion of A. G. Wathelet. The arbitral tribunal 
stressed that the claimants had brought forth a significant number of awards, 18 in 
number, where jurisdiction was maintained over intra-EU investment treaty disputes. 
Additionally, it stated that it found no valid reason to take on a different path from the 
path tribunals chose in the Masdar v. Spain and in the Novenergia v. Spain.71 
 Another case where the Masdar v. Spain ruling regarding the jurisdiction was 
determative was the famous Vattenfall case. The tribunal established in the case 
Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany rejected another Achmea 
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objection jurisdiction.72 In its decision, on 31 August 2018, the tribunal rejected the 
claim of the Respondent, the Federal Republic of Germany, who argued, that since this 
dispute is between two EU – Member States, EU Law based on the principle of primacy, 
should prevail over the ECT and that thus Article 26 of the ECT, (the ISDS mechanism) 
should be interpreted strictly. The ICSID tribunal rejected the above objection, asserting 
once again that the Achmea Ruling referred only to BITs concluded between EU - 
member states and not to multilateral treaties like the ECT, to which the EU itself is a 
party along with others. The tribunal supported its argument, by further noting that, the 
wording of the ISDS provision (Article 8) found in the Dutch – Slovak BIT that was at 
issue in the Achmea Case is different from the wording used in the ISDS provision 
(Article 26) of the ECT. Therefore, it is even more unclear if the ECJ Ruling applies to the 
facts of the Vattenfall Case. 
It is easily comprehensible that both ICSID and non – ICSID tribunals would seek 
to narrow the impact and application of the Achmea Case in favour of the continued 
validity of arbitral proceedings. The common understanding that has developed among 
the tribunals is that when the arbitral proceedings proceed based on the provisions of 
the ECT, the jurisdiction of ICSID or non - ICSID tribunals is not in question. This 
perception is based mainly on the argument that the legal basis for the establishment of 
the tribunal is the ECT itself and not the European Law, thus eliminating the relevance of 
the primacy of EU Law principle. This perception is quite interesting, in view of the 
communication published by the European Commission on 19 July 2018.73 This 
document asserted that the Achmea Ruling applied not only to all intra – EU BITs, but 
also to the ISDS provisions established in Article 26 of the ECT. One could argue, that the 
position the ICSID (and non- ICSID) tribunals have adopted is quite brave and maybe 
even risky, given that it appears to contravene the stated position of the EC. 
Fascinating recent developments have taken place in the Micula Case,74 which is 
worth examining since it attracted contributors the EC and General Court of Justice of 
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the European Union (‘EGC’). Once again, the Achmea Objection was overruled, however 
this time from the U.S. Court.75  
As this is a convoluted case, a very brief background is necessary. In 1998, 
Romania wanted to attract investors to certain disadvantaged areas through the 
establishment of economic incentives76. These economic incentives related to tax 
advantages, which were applicable to under - developed regions.77 Two Swedish 
brothers, Ioan and Viorel Micula, decided to invest in these areas in order to benefit 
from the aforementioned advantages. The claimants stated that they had established 
their businesses in the Ştei-Nucet-Drăgăneşti region of north-western Romania on the 
belief that the tax incentives would be in place for a decade.78 In 2004, Romania’s 
accession to the EU turned things upside down. Prior to its accession, Romania was 
compelled by the EU to withdraw these advantageous tax measures, because they 
constituted state aid and as such were not allowed under EU Law.79 Since Sweden and 
Romania had concluded a BIT in 2002,80 which provided for the ISDS mechanism, the 
Swedish brothers instigated ICSID arbitration proceedings in 2005. It is vital to note that, 
at the time of the arbitration in 2005, Romania was still not a member of the EU, which 
was a fundamental factor in the award rendered by the ICSID tribunal. According to the 
rendering of the arbitral tribunal, insofar as the dispute refers to the time prior to the 
accession of Romania into the EU, the EU law is not applicable and hence, no conflict of 
law exists. Throughout the arbitration proceedings, the EC intervened as amicus curiae 
(friend of the court) where it stated, inter alia, that the tribunal should interpret the 
intra EU – BIT in light of the EU law, as the ECJ had recommended in the Van Gen end 
Loos [1963] Case.81 Furthermore, it stated that in the event that the tribunal were to 
decide in favour of the Micula brothers, the award could not be implemented by 
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Romania, since it would contravene Romania’s obligations as an EU member state 
according to the principal of EU law supremacy regarding state aid. To support its 
position, EC invoked the rendering by the ECJ of the ECO Swiss Case.82 The ECJ asserted 
that the EU competition rules constitute a part of the public order, which national states 
courts should examine, sua sponte, in the process of recognition and enforcement of an 
arbitral award under the exception provided by the New York Convention (‘NYC’).83 
Despite the intervention of the EC, the ICSID tribunal in its award dated, 11 December 
2013, ordered Romania to pay RON 376,433,229 (€178 million) as damages, due to the 
breach of the Fair and Equitable principle provided in Article 2 of the aforementioned 
BIT. Nevertheless, the tribunal’s ruling did not conclude with rendering of the final 
award. In May of 2014, the EC issued a suspension injunction prohibiting Romania from 
complying with the award on the grounds that doing so would be contrary to EU law.84 
In the meantime, Romania had already proceeded in a partial payment of the award, 
which according to the EC85 constituted state aid, and hence, Romania should recover 
the amount paid and should not proceed with any further payment. Romania, naturally, 
tried to have the award annulled by the ad hoc committee mechanism provided in ICSID 
Arbitration however, the request was denied.86  
A further surprising twist to this case was added by the EGC, in a very recent 
decision.87 On 18 June 2019, the EGC upheld the petition of the investors and vacated 
the EC’s Decision on State Aid, EU-2015/1470, based on the fact that European State Aid 
Law was inapplicable in the specific case, at the specific time, and that the EC had 
exercised its powers in a retroactive manner. What is more, the GJEU referred to the 
Achmea Case, by differentiating it from the Micula Case. The Court based its decision on 
the same argument with the arbitral tribunal, i. e. that the arbitral tribunal in the Micula 
Case did not have to apply EU law, since Romania, at the time of the dispute, was still 
not considered a member of the European Union, contrary to the Achmea Tribunal. At 
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this point, EC has filed an appeal before the ECJ against the GJEU’s decision in the Micula 
Case.88 
The Micula Brothers, faced with endless difficulties in terms of recognizing and 
enforcing the award in the Europe Union, they decided to give a try in the US. The U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia in its opinion issued on 11 September 2009,89 
granted enforcement of the award in favour of the Micula brothers and ordered 
Romania to pay the amount of the $331,557,687. Romania raised four challenges 
against the enforcement where amongst others it invoked the Achmea Ruling. The US 
Court relied on the GJEU’s decision, i.e. that the Achmea Decision is irrelevant in the 
present case, since the arbitration proceedings instigated prior to the entrance of 
Romania in the European Union. This was the first time a US Court referred to the 
Achmea Case.90 Even though, the specific judgment of the US Court was considered a 
big win regarding intra – EU BIT awards, it should not be regarded as establishing broad 
precedent. The reason is that, in this particular case, the US proceeded with the 
enforcement of the award, because it did not find applicable EU law. It still remains to 
be seen, how the US Courts will handle petitions for the enforcement of awards, when 
both participants of the dispute constitute member of the EU, and whether the US 
Courts in such cases, will proceed indeed with the enforcement will invalidate it based 
on the application of the Achmea Judgment. 
It follows that the Achmea Judgment has had a limited impact on the 
arbitration’s community perspective. Even though, this judgment initially seemed to be 
a heaven-sent weapon for any Respondent in pending intra-EU arbitration proceedings 
in terms of the ultimate outcome it would serve, this evidently was not the case. It 
merely managed to offer a delay before an adjudicated outcome with the same result 
that arbitration would have offered either way. Arbitral tribunals seem to have chosen 
to continue on the path outlined in the pre – Achmea era. 
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Taking into consideration the reaction of the tribunals in the aforementioned 
cases, some limited conclusions can still be drown. It seems that with respect to the 
enforcement of an arbitral award outside the EU, the Achmea Case has almost no effect. 
In the same context, arbitral tribunals seated outside the EU, and especially those 
established under the ICSID rules will have a profound amount of flexibility regarding 
the application of the Achmea Case. This advantage exists because the review of an 
ICSID arbitral award by national courts and its subsequent vacation based on the 
Achmea Judgment is highly unlikely, since the EU law supremacy principle is not in effect 
outside the EU, in the sense that EU does not have a binding effect on these courts.91 
With respect, however, to the ongoing role of arbitral tribunals and the enforceability of 
their awards within the EU, due to the rapid developments of the current situation and 
actions taking place on behalf of EU instruments, the sky seems to be much darker. 
The Fluctuation of the European’s Commission Attitude 
It is interesting to note that the EC’s initial perspective on BITs was generally 
positive; it offered written support by mentioning these investor – friendly policies in 
association agreements that headed to official accession.92 However, this positive 
attitude eventually changed 180 degrees with the accession of a number of countries 
into the European Union.93 The landscape shifted with the Lisbon Treaty entered into 
force in 2009,94 under the terms of which the member states conferred the competence 
of concluding investment agreements on the EU.95 Consequently, the conclusion of 
investment agreements elevated from a national matter to an EU matter. The first signs 
of EC’s hostility towards these agreements came in 2004, when it instigated 
infringement proceedings against four member states, alleging inconsistencies between 
intra-EU BITs and EU law and provisions relating to the free movement of capital.96 The 
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first decisive measures against these intra – EU BITs took place in June 2015, when the 
EC, through a press release initiated infringement proceedings against five states 
(Austria, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden).97 In essence, through letters 
of formal notice, it was asking them to terminate the BITs they had concluded with 
other member states, based on the argument that they were obsolete and not 
congruent with EU law. It further stated, that these BITs existed in order to provide an 
extra layer of protection for investors which, as a result of the states’ accession to the 
EU, was both unnecessary and discriminatory with regard to other member states which 
might not have concluded such BITs. The EC continued showing its opposition to intra-
EU BITs by intervening in a number of arbitral proceedings, as shown above, in order to 
in order to establish its position that these ISDS provisions were inconsistent with 
prevailing EU law and perpetuated a conflict that should be resolved by their 
abrogation. 
Confident Steps Towards the End 
In the aftermath of the Achmea Judgment, a recent Communication from the 
EC,98 has continued the effort to address the issue of protection of intra – EU 
investments took place, while addressing the Achmea Judgment. The context of this 
communication is quite interesting, as it seems to be a pro-active effort to instill 
confidence in potential investors despite EC insistence that arbitration proceedings 
based on the ISDS clause in an existing intra–EU BIT is invalid. According to this 
Communication, the EC asserts that investors scan rely wholly on existing EU law, which 
has progressed over the years, to provide a sufficient level of protection. The fact that 
EU rights have direct effect before national courts, in combination with the preliminary 
reference mechanism found in Article 267 of TFEU should suffice for cross -investors to 
have confidence when deciding to invest in other EU member states, other than their 
home state. The Communication emphasizes the problematic that arose with the 
enlargement of the EU and the transformation to pre-existing BITs to intra-EU BITs, and 
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stresses the fact that the resulting parallel treaty system could interfere with the full and 
systematic application of EU law. Support for this argument is derived through an 
indirect reference to the Micula Case. Before addressing the clarification of impact that 
the Achmea Judgment has, it stressed once more, that intra – EU BITs, through the 
conferral of preferential rights to investors from a particular member state, were not 
consistent with the principle of non – discrimination which derives from the existence of 
the single market under EU law.  
The EC then proceeded with a lengthy analysis of the Achmea Judgment and its 
Consequences, and summarised the ECJ’s Ruling as having in essence determined that 
ISDS clauses are unlawful, that they undermine the system of legal remedies, which is 
provided in the EU through the EU Treaties, and therefore jeopardize ‘the autonomy, 
effectiveness, primacy and direct effect of Union law and the principle of mutual trust 
between the Member States’.  Hence, according to the EC’s interpretation of the 
Achmea Judgment, any arbitral tribunal established on the basis of an invalid ISDS clause 
provided for in an intra – EU BIT simply lacks jurisdiction. It therefore follows that, any 
national court of a member state, called upon to enforce any judgment issued by such 
tribunal must annul it and refuse to enforce it. The EC Communication made it clear that 
the Achmea Judgment also applies to pending arbitration proceedings. Additionally, 
pursuant to the principle of legal certainty, Member States are officially bound to 
terminate their intra EU – BITs.  
The EC further clarified its position, noted above, that the Achmea Judgment is 
also applicable to ISDS mechanism provided for in the ECT when its application is sought 
with respect to arbitrations between parties from EU states. As stated in the 
Communication, this provision needs to be interpreted narrowly and not be applied to 
disputes between EU member states, which would infringe upon the principle of 
supremacy of EU law. This assertion was based on the argument that the application of 
this mechanism would lead to the very result which the EU is trying to avoid through the 
termination of all intra–EU BITs, that is, affording the opportunity to bodies which do 
not constitute a part of the EU judicial system to interpret and apply EU law. The EC 
Communication also rejected one basic argument that arbitral tribunals invoked when 
ECT claims were brought before them, that is, the fact that EU is a member of the ECT. 
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According to the Communication, the fact that the EU is a signatory to the ECT gives 
birth only to rights and obligations between third countries and the EU. It is thus 
abundantly clear, based on this Communication, that the EC is determined to see the 
absolute and irreversible end of intra–EU BITs.  
This Communication raises unavoidable questions with respect to pending or 
future enforcement proceedings arising out of investor–state arbitral awards based on 
ISDS provisions of existing intra–EU BITs. The EC’s simplified and stark position is that 
national courts should annul these awards and refuse enforcement. Investors, however, 
have the flexibility to choose among different arbitral institutions and rules, for instance 
ICSID, SSC99 or UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and Ad hoc Arbitration. This selection will 
probably determine and the future of the arbitral award. 
Awards that do not fall under the ICSID regime fall under the New York 
Convention ‘NYC’ regime and national arbitration statutes.100 Article V of the NYC 
provides for a national court to refuse enforcement of a foreign award on grounds that 
include the invalidity of the arbitration agreement and the violation of public policy. The 
Achmea Judgment, when viewed alongside with this Communication, provides ample 
justification for national courts to successfully invoke Art. V of the NYC. 
Insofar as ICSID are awards are concerned, their future does not seem so 
gloomy, at least up to this point. This is because ICSID awards can only be reviewed for 
annulment by an ad hoc committee as provided for in the ICSID Convention. 
Furthermore, according to Article 54 of the ICSID Convention provides that every state, 
which is a contracting party to the Convention,101 must recognize and enforce an ICSID 
arbitral award ‘as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State’. In other words, 
these awards are automatically enforceable by all the contracting states, whether EU 
members or not, without being subject to further review by domestic courts. It could be 
argued that the Micula Case undermines this argument since it has thus far proved 
impossible to have this ICSID award enforced within the EU. In practice, despite the fact 
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that ICSID awards enjoy more favourable treatment from a legal standpoint, the EC has 
thus far managed to mount formidable obstacles with respect to their enforcement. 
Adding to the climate of uncertainty, even though the ECJ’s Achmea Judgment 
specifically addresses the ISDS provisions within intra-EU BITs alone, it is possible to 
extend the reasoning behind the determination of incompatibility with EU law in the 
case of BITs concluded between an EU states and a non-EU state. Let us proceed with a 
hypothetic scenario: A dispute arises between a foreign investor(as in coming from 
outside the EU) and EU member state, as to the treatment of the foreign investor in the 
European market and arbitration proceedings commence, where the arbitral tribunal is 
obliged, due to the nature of the dispute, to engage with EU law matters. A final award 
is rendered and the foreign investor proceeds to enforce it before the national court in 
the EU member state. The national court, or in the case of a preliminary ruling, the ECJ, 
could decide not to recognize and enforce it, because it would affect the autonomy of 
EU law. 
Hence, despite the major efforts of the ECJ and the EC, to reassure non- EU 
investors that the Achmea Judgment has nothing to do with them, in practice, it creates 
legal uncertainty on a worldwide level with regards to investors coming from third 
states and their consequent willingness to invest in a EU member state.  
Evidence is growing that the impact of the Achmea Judgment, intended or not, is 
not limited to intra-EU BITs but also extends to the power of enforcement of ICSID 
arbitral awards as well as to the guarantees contained in BITs between foreign investors 
and EU member states. What remains to be seen is the aftermath in numbers, i.e., how 
this insecurity will affect the foreign direct investment in the EU.  
The Declaration of the End 
Ultimately the concerted efforts of the ECJ and the EC bore fruit when, on 15 
January 2019, the official termination of intra – EU BITs was declared by 22 member 
states. This 4-page Declaration102 signified the post Achmea era, essentially codified 
official aftermath of the Achmea Judgment. To put it plainly, all roads lead to Rome. 
                                                 
102 ‘Declaration of the Member States of 15 January 2019 on the Legal Consequences of the Achmea 
Judgment and on Investment Protection’ 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/190117bilateralinvestment-treaties_en> accessed 3 January 
2020 
   
28 
 
Through this Declaration, the Member States place all investment arbitral 
tribunals on notice with respect to the legal repercussions of the ECJ’s Achmea 
Judgment on ISDS provisions, and pledge to institute all necessary measures in order to 
be compliant with their obligations deriving from EU law. The thorny question of 
whether EU law takes precedence over the ISDS provisions in intra–EU BITs is officially 
settled and no longer constitutes a matter of interpretation. The Declaration clearly 
stipulates that EU law takes precedence and thus that arbitral tribunals established on 
the basis of ISDS provisions found in such agreements have no jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the dispute due to the invalidity of the arbitration agreement.  
The directives that flow from this decisive disposition are short and simple. The 
Achmea Judgment makes it clear that all pending arbitrations must be summarily 
terminated. The wording of the Declaration allows the understanding that member 
states were justified in presuming the validity of such tribunals only to the extent that 
they were unaware of the Achmea Judgment and not because they just do not adopt its 
reasoning. Furthermore, investors are on notice to abstain from initiating further 
arbitration proceedings from the date of the Declaration, and the national courts of all 
member states or of any third state are directed not to recognize or enforce an arbitral 
award deriving from any intra–EU BIT, but to refuse recognition and set aside the award 
based on the invalidity of the underlying treaty. Finally, the Declaration provides that 
arbitral awards that can no longer be set aside should not be challenged and that 
further discussion among the member states will determine their disposition. 
The Directive provides that the mechanism for terminating existing intra-EU BITs 
is by means of either a multilateral or bilateral treaty, depending on the circumstance. 
This is unusual, since most existing BITs already contain the terms of their termination in 
order to provide a protection period of between 10 and 20 years for investments made 
prior to the termination.103 These sunset and grandfathering104 clauses, which provide 
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the legal basis for investors to bring forth claims even after the termination will not be 
adhered to, according to the Declaration, which asserts them void. 
Another crucial subject area where the member states adopt without any 
hesitation EC’s Communication is with respect to the validity of the ISDS provision 
included in the ECT. The Communication makes it clear that the Achmea Judgment 
invalidates reliance on this provision for intra-EU ECT arbitrations to avoid 
incompatibility with EU law. This development deals a crushing blow to the argument 
advanced by the arbitral tribunals that the fact that the EU is a signatory to the ECT 
implies its consent to refer any dispute arising from that treaty to arbitration (see for 
instance the Vattenfall Case and the Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief UA Case). 
It is worth noting that dissenting voices still exist with respect to the applicability 
of the ISDS provisions of the ECT. The first is the January 2019 Declaration105 issued on 
behalf of Finland, Malta, Luxemburg, Sweden, and Slovenia, which signal its agreement 
with all the aspects of the 22 Member State Declaration except for the part concerning 
the ECT. Specifically, this Declaration asserts the conservative position that, since the 
Achmea Judgment was silent regarding the ISDS provision in the ECT, the decision 
should not be presumed to affect intra-EU ECT arbitration proceedings as well at least 
until the ECJ has made an official ruling on the subject matter. The second 
Declaration,106 issued on the same date, comes from Hungary, and not only adopts the 
same arguments as the five-state Declaration but takes in one step further to reject 
completely the ECJ’s Achmea Judgment applicability to the ECT. To sum up, up till now, 
22 Member States have sided with the EC’s views and 6 Member States have decided to 
assert limited but significant objections. Only the future will show whether this act of 
rebellion will prove to be fruitful or whether it will be in vain. 
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Lastly, in full harmony with the EC Communication, the 22 Member State 
Declaration states their view that the level of reassurance provided by the EU legal 
system suffices to insure security for investors. It expounds the conviction of the 
signatories that EU investors are provided with adequate protection guarantees deriving 
by the EU legal system in the whole; by the general principles of EU law, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU and EU primary and secondary legislation. This legal 
framework works in concert with the obligations of each member state to ensure that 
their national judicial systems comply with the EU legal protection to ensure uniform 
application of that protection. 
It is worth mentioning that while these Declarations do not have the binding 
effect of agreements, they serve to signal, on a practical level, the long term aspirations 
of the European Commission. While there no longer remains any cogent argument for 
the ongoing validity of intra–EU BIT arbitrations, there may still be a glimmer of hope 
regarding intra-EU ECT arbitration proceedings (although that would require a very bold, 
or desperate legal team). Another interesting question that needs to be carefully 
addressed is whether these political declarations, which affect the application of the 
provisions of the intra-EU BITs, should be treated as subsequent provisions in the sense 
of Article 31 (3) (a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties?107  
Throughout 2019, there were intense preparations and negotiations to establish 
the process for the member states to honor the commitments made in their 
Declarations. On 24 October 2019, the EC issued an official statement108 that a majority 
of its member states had agreed to terminate their intra–EU BITs through a plurilateral 
treaty. The official text of the Termination Agreement has not yet been released and 
subsequently it remains to the mechanics of the transition process, i.e., the timeline of 
termination, the disposition of sunset clauses as well as the handling of ongoing and 
concluded arbitration proceedings. The incontrovertible fact is that a longstanding EU 
objective is on becoming a reality. Due to the existence of the divergent Declarations of 
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January 2019, it is important to note that the Statement is directly related only to intra-
EU BITs, and that the status of the arbitration provisions of the ECT remain to be 
clarified. Until that time, theoretically, investors still have a chance to enforce the 
substantive guarantees that are provided for by the ECT, since these should remain 
unaffected. As a practical matter, of course, it is unlikely that the domestic courts of the 
host state will be willing to enforce any judgments issued by an arbitral tribunal in 
reliance of the ISDS provisions of the ECT. 
What does the Future for Investment Protection within the EU hold? 
Circa 200 intra-EU BITs that are still in force are reaching the end of their 
lifespan. The fallout of the Achmea Judgment has left investors with a legal landscape 
that at one time would have been the worst-case scenario, and their concerns will need 
to be addressed. One indisputable result of the sudden elimination of the intra–EU 
investment arbitration system is a climate of investor uncertainty with respect to the 
investment dispute resolution system. Investors within the EU have been summarily 
deprived from the option of bringing their claims before an independent arbitral panel 
of their own choice; the question is what alternatives exist to replace this option? 
Possible Future Alternatives 
According to the wording used by the ECJ in the Achmea Judgment, the 
incompatibility issue was found in ISDS provisions contained within intra-EU BITs. 
Without further judicial clarification, one could argue that the arbitration problem is 
limited to provisions within these treaties alone. This could mean that the Achmea 
Judgment could not be invoked to invalidate an arbitration provision contained within a 
private contract between the foreign investor and the host State. Such a theoretical 
possibility is not, however, a realistic scenario, since it is doubtful that any member state 
would execute such a contract. Another possible way for investors to secure access to 
arbitral proceedings would be through treaty shopping where they would seek 
protection under extra – EU BITs, but as mentioned previously, the Achmea Reasoning 
could be easily invoked under such circumstances as well.  
Investors have always been free to rely on the domestic court system of the host 
state, and the EC position, together with the political declarations of the member states, 
asserts that this framework should suffice for the investors.  From the investors’ point of 
   
32 
 
view, however, there are serious reservations. The desire to avoid unfamiliar national 
court systems, the cost of hiring local counsel to navigate the vagaries of specific 
proceedings, and the fear of a biased or even corrupt court system are the concerns that 
spurred the development of the ISDS mechanism in the first place. It is quite 
understandable that from the investor’s perspective national courts are not the ideal 
forum for dispute settlement. Justifiably or not, investors will always fear prejudice from 
the courts of the State against which they are trying to pursue their claim. Especially in 
cases where large amounts of money are involved, the sense of judicial royalty to the 
Forum State is likely to have an impact on the outcome on the outcome of the 
proceedings.109 In other words, in the eyes of the investors, the ISDS mechanism 
signified the dawn of the international investment regime which significantly enhanced 
their level of protection against unilateral governmental actions. The alternative of 
trying to establish a claim before the national courts of the investor’s home state or 
those of a third state is rarely a feasible option due to the lack of territorial jurisdiction. 
In addition to this hindrance, in these type of cases Acta Jure Imperii usually paves the 
way in the sense that host states act in the exercise of sovereign powers and not in 
commercial capacity (Acta Jure Gestionis).110 By taking away the ISDS mechanism and 
relegating the investors to seek resolution in national courts, the EU has effectively 
returned to point zero, before all this investment development took place. 
Forget the traditional ISDS mechanism and welcome the future, Investment Courts 
This decade has welcomed a new wave of bilateral and multilateral free trade 
agreements (‘FTAs’). Right now EU is a party to the Canada – EU Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (‘CETA’),111 the EU – Singapore Investment Protection 
Agreement (‘ESIPA’)112 and the EU – Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (‘EVFTA’),113 while 
other significant agreements such as the US–EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
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Partnership (‘TTIP’)114 and the modernized EU–Mexico Global Agreement (‘EMGA’)115 
are still under negotiation. In all these agreements, the old fashioned ISDS provisions 
have been replaced by a permanent adjudicatory mechanism called the Investment 
Court System (‘ICS’). This came as an answer to the urgency to establish ‘the rule of law 
and not the rule of lawyers’116 as Cecilia Malmoström, the Trade Commissioner, had 
previously stated regarding the widespread perception of the investment arbitration 
practice under intra–EU BITs. The development of the Investment Court System was 
evidence that the ISDS concept had fallen from grace.117 The EC published the 
innovative proposal,118 which introduced this new investment court system, on 12 
November 2015. 
No Compatibility Issue this Time 
On 6 September 2017, Belgium’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Didier Reynders submitted his country’s request119 to the ECJ asking for a 
clarification of whether the ICS, which was first introduced in the CETA, is compatible 
with the European Treaties. Advocate General Bot issued a non–binding opinion in 
January 2019 verifying that the ICS is compatible with EU law 120. A.G. Bot confidently 
stated,  ‘I take the view that the investor-State dispute resolution system provided for in 
Section F of Chapter 8 of the CETA does not undermine the autonomy of EU law and, in 
particular, does not affect the principle that the Court (i.e. ECJ) has exclusive jurisdiction 
over the definitive interpretation of EU law.’121 This opinion is advisory and does not 
have the effect of legal precedent, and we have indeed experienced in the past total 
contradiction between an A.G’s opinion and a ECJ decision (see A.G. Wathelet and ECJ in 
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Achmea); however, this time it ended up in total conformity the ECJ’s opinion which was 
rendered on 30 April 2019.122  
ECJ proceeded to address Belgium’s concerns almost effortlessly. According to 
the ECJ, there is no reason for an incompatibility issue between the ICS Court and the 
autonomy of EU law to arise, since these two, in practice, will never meet. The ICS Court 
will not have the power to use the preliminary reference mechanism, which was also 
the case with the traditional arbitral tribunals encompassed in intra–EU BITs, so prima 
facie, these two mechanisms are the same. However, the ECJ clarified that there is no 
need to have access to this mechanism, since CETA Tribunals have jurisdiction to 
interpret and apply only CETA provisions. Furthermore, they will not have the power to 
render decisions that could prohibit EU Institutions from operating according to the EU 
Constitutional Framework. According to the CETA provisions and in particular Article 
8.41, awards rendered by the CETA tribunals have no erga omnes effect and thus there 
is no possibility to impinge ‘on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court over the definitive 
interpretation of EU law.’123 Ultimately, the ECJ made very clear that the CETA ICS 
functions exclusively outside the EU legal order and as such, it cannot adversely affect it. 
To sum up, the ECJ faced no difficulty in addressing Belgium’s over the compatibility of 
the CETA with EU law.   
The purpose of ICS, as it was proposed in the context of the TTIP in November 
2015,124 which does not differ fundamentally from the ones accepted in the Vietnam 
and Canada agreements,125 is to provide effective safeguards both for the member 
states and for the EU. The main objective is to provide a neutral environment for 
investors to bring forth their claims, as they would in international arbitration 
proceedings. It will contribute to bringing transparency to the system through publicly 
appointed judges, operating under the highest ethical standards and with the possibility 
of addressing errors through access to a tribunal of second instance. The ICS will take 
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the form of a two – tier, quasi-judicial mechanism, a first instance tribunal and a 
permanent appellate tribunal. Parties to the treaty will appoint fifteen judges to six-year 
terms on the first instance tribunal, which can be renewed only once. The Appellate 
Body will be composed of six members, again appointed by the Treaty parties for a six-
year period, whose term can be renewed more than once. The outside time limit for any 
proceeding before this mechanism is a total of two years; eighteen months for the first 
instance to decide and six months for the appellate tribunal. It is important to note that, 
even though the US Agreement uses the words ‘judges’ and ‘courts’, these terms refer 
only to the mechanism described above, and it is clear that there is no intention of the 
EU to create new international judicial bodies. The foundation of this system still 
comprises of arbitration principles; thus, final decisions will be considered awards and as 
such will be enforceable under the NYC and ICSID Convention. Additionally, the whole 
proceeding will be based on existing arbitration rules and since no permanent 
secretariat is established, it remains ad hoc.126 One could say that this system is a hybrid 
model.  
To sum up, since the CETA Court is considered compatible with the EU law, the 
same can be said for all the ICS Courts provided for in the rest of the FTAs. The ECJ’s 
blessing must be acknowledged as a big win for the EC, who has been trying for so many 
years to reform the ISDS system. From this point on, the EC has received the green light 
not only for the ICS but also for the creation of its ultimate objection that is nothing 
other than the establishment of the envisaged Multilateral Permanent Court for 
investment dispute settlement (‘MIC’), which is, currently, under discussion by the 
Uncitral Working Group III.127 
One Should not turn a Blind Eye 
Naturally, the potential for this achievement does not mean that the investment 
climate is now an absolute success. While it is clear that the ICS encompasses a number 
of advantages, it has already been subject to criticism. One way to ensure impartiality in 
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the newly introduced ISDS system -which was supposedly lacking in the traditional ISDS 
system- is through the prevention of the parties from choosing their judges. According 
to experts, this modification could re-introduce a long absent political component and 
as such diminish the great achievement of the previous arbitration regime, the de-
politicization of investment disputes.128 Another criticism levelled at the old system was 
doubt as to whether privately appointed arbitrators were impartial. Who can guarantee 
that government appointed judges will not feel the urge to favor their own state?129 
Another issue that could potentially arise concerns the quality of the decisions under 
the new ICS system. In traditional arbitration proceedings, the parties could choose the 
arbitrators they based on their expertise and knowledge of the specific subject matter, 
no matter the cost. Under the ICS regime, some argue that if the financial incentives are 
insufficient, it will not attract the respected high–profile individuals required, but rather 
proceed with political appointees.130 
One thing that is certain at this juncture is that EC’s ICS proposal has not yet won 
the hearts and minds of the public or the investors. Only time will tell whether the ICS 
will serve as a more efficient, transparent and fair system with the same objective as the 
traditional ISDS provision, that is, to protect foreign investors from discriminatory 
behaviour of the host state.  Nevertheless, as Wayne Knight once said, whatever road 
you have been given, enjoy that road. Investors can do little but proceed with the means 
they are provided with.  
 
 
Conclusion 
When the Achmea Judgment was first issued, there were two potential 
outcomes: it could have represented merely a short – term disruption, or it could be 
seized upon to pave the way for a fundamental change of the investor – state dispute 
resolution system. With the support of the EC, the Achmea Judgment became the first in 
a series of developments that rapidly escalated in the latter direction. The overriding 
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purpose of the traditional ISDS provisions was to provide substantial protection to 
private investors by insulating them from discriminatory measures and expropriation 
tactics in foreign countries, where they felt that the legal system was not at the same 
level as in their home state.  
The EC had made its opposition to intra–EU BITs known from early on, but until 
recently few believed the EC could prevail against a trusted and convenient arbitration 
mechanism. Years of fighting proved successful and ended up being rewarded by the ECJ 
in 2018. This ground-breaking Judgment will remain in history as the benchmark of the 
ISDS reform. The EU, acting through the EC, exercised its power once again and crushed 
a system which was the alpha and omega of the FDI protection, without, however, 
having a ready alternative mechanism whereby member states could be compelled to 
respect investors’ substantive rights.131 It is therefore possible that this reduction of the 
level of protection in intra–EU relations could have an adverse effect on future streams 
of foreign direct investment. 
Since the ramifications of the Achmea Judgment and subsequent EC Directives 
are still unfolding, it is impossible to draw definitive conclusions. It is indisputable that 
the arbitration community suffered a series of blows from which it cannot recover, from 
further court decisions relying on the Achmea Judgment to the EC-led death of intra–EU 
investment arbitration. A new era has commenced, but until all of the above proposals, 
regarding the ICS and the MIC actually come to life, it will be an era of uncertainty and 
hesitation. A long road lies ahead where EU, will need to take drastic measures to 
restore investor confidence, or risk losing a substantial percentage of foreign 
investment.  
The energy sector is a huge component of capital inflow within the EU and 
simultaneously a sector were most disputes arise. It is a sector where investors, due to 
huge amount of money they have to invest and the high level of interaction with 
governmental instruments and national legislation, demand a substantial level of 
protection which at this point they no longer enjoy within the EU. At the same time, the 
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EU has set a number of renewably energy targets that need to be achieved by 2030,132 
which cannot be accomplished without significant non-state investment; whether the 
investors will feel confident enough to respond remains to be seen. The impact of the 
Achmea Judgment set in motion the termination of all remaining intra-EU BITs and 
ultimately ended investment arbitration in the energy sector as well;  how things will 
develop from henceforth, time alone will tell. 
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 <https://www.irena.org/europe> accessed 23 December 2019 
   
39 
 
Bibliography 
Table of International Treaties and Conventions 
1. Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
(Kingdom of the Netherlands – the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) (signed 29 
April 1991, entered into force 1 October 1992)  
2. Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the 
Government of Romania on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments (Romania - Sweden BIT) (signed 2002, entered into force 2003) 
3. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), (EU – Canada) (signed 
30 October 2016)  
4. Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2016] OJ C202/1. 
5. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States (International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes [ICSID] (opened for signature 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 
October 1966) 575 UNTS 159 
6. Draft Proposal Text of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Trade 
in Services, Investment and E-Commerce (EU – US)  
7. EU – Mexico Trade Agreement in Principle, (EU – Mexico) (signed in April 2018)  
8. EU - Singapore Investment Protection Agreement, (EU – Singapore) (signed 19 
October 2018)  
9. EU - Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, (EU – Government of the Socialist Republic 
of Viet Nam) (signed 30 June 2019)  
10. Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (with Protocol and 
exchange of notes) Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (with 
Protocol and exchange of notes), (Germany - Pakistan) (signed 25 November 
1959, entered into force 28 November 1962) 457 UNTS 24 
11. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, (signed December 2007, entered into 
force 2009), OJ C 306  
   
40 
 
12. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards ( opened for signature 10 June 1958) Res 4739 UNTS 330 p.3 
13. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (United Nations) (signed on 23 May 
1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331 
Legislation 
1. Code of Civil Procedure as promulgated on 5 December 2005 (Bundesgesetzblatt 
(BGBl., Federal Law Gazette) I page 3202; 2006 I page 431; 2007 I page 1781), 
last amended by Article 1 of the Act dated 10 October 2013 (Federal Law Gazette 
I page 3786 
Books 
1. Asteris D. Pliakos, Law of the European Union Statutory and Substantial Law, (1st 
Edn, Nomiki Vivliothiki 2012) 
2. Chester Brown, 4 The Development by States of Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, (1st Edn, Brill, Nijhoff 2014) 
3. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (1st Edn 1996, Oxford 
University Press 1998) 
4. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, United States Investment Treaties: Policy and Practice, 
(1st Edn, Oxford University Press 1992) 
5. R. Doak Bishop, James Crawford, W. Micheal Reisman, Foreign Investment 
Disputes, (1st Edn, Kluwer Law International 2005) 
6. Sylvia T Tonova and Baiju S Vasani, ‘Enforcement of Investment Treaty Awards 
Against Assets of States, State Entities and State-Owned Companies’, in Joulien 
Fouret Enforcement of Investment Treaty Arbitration Awards: A Global Guide (1st 
Edn, Globe Law & Business 2015) 
7. Thomas W. Wälde, The Energy Charter Treaty: An East – West Gateaway for 
Investment & Trade, (1st Edn, Kluwer Law International 1996) 
8. Thomas Roe and Matthew Happold, Settlement of Investment Disputes under the 
Energy Charter Treaty’, (1st Edn, Cambridge University Press 2011) 
9. Tomáš Fecák, International Investment Agreeements and EU Law, (1st Edn, 
Kluwer Law International 2016) 
 
   
41 
 
Journals Articles  
1. Ahmad J, “Slowakische Republik (Slovak Republic) v. Achmea BV (C.J.E.U.)” 
(2019) 58 International Legal Materials 1101 
2. Jacob Grierson, 'The Court of Justice of the European Union and International 
Arbitration', in Annet van Hooft and Jean-François Tossens (eds), (2019)  2 
Belgian Review of Arbitration 309  
3. Jeswald W. Salacuse, 'Chapter 14. The Energy Charter and Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Regimes ', in Thomas W. Wälde (ed), The Energy Charter Treaty: An East-
West Gateway for Investment and Trade, (1996) Kluwer Law International 321  
4. Nagy CI, ‘Intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law After Achmea: ‘Know 
Well What Leads You Forward and What Holds You Back’ (2018) 19 (4) German 
Law Journal 981 
5. Nicolas de Sadeleer, ‘The End of the Game: The Autonomy of the EU Legal Order 
Opposes Arbitral Tribunals under Bilateral Investment Treaties Concluded 
between Two Member States’, (2018) 9 (2) European Journal of Risk Regulation 
6.  Nikos Lavranos and Tania Singla, 'Achmea: Groundbreaking or Overrated?', in 
Jörg Risse , Günter Pickrahn , et al. (eds) (2018) 16 German Arbitration Journal 
348  
7. Pohl JH, ‘Intra-EU Investment Arbitration after the Achmea Case: Legal 
Autonomy Bounded by Mutual Trust?’ (2018) 14 European Constitutional Law 
Review 767 
8. Salacuse, JW & Sullivan, ‘Do BITs really work?: An evaluation of bilateral 
investment treaties and their grand bargain’, (2005), 46 Harvard International 
Law Journal 67 
9. Xavier Taton, Guillaume Croisant, 'Judicial Protection of Investors in the 
European Union: The Remedies Offered by Investment Arbitration, the European 
Convention on Human Rights and EU Law', (2018) VII (2) Indian Journal of 
Arbitration Law 61  
 
 
 
   
42 
 
Online Journals 
1. Céline Lévesque, ‘The European Union Commission Proposal for the Creation of 
an “Investment Court System”: The Q and A that the Commission Won’t Be 
Issuing’ (2016) Kluwer Arbitration Blog 
<http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/04/06/the-european-union-
commission-proposal-for-the-creation-of-an-investment-court-system-the-q-
and-a-that-the-commission-wont-be-issuing/>accessed 5 January 2020 
2. Charris-Benedetti, Juan Pablo, The proposed Investment Court System: does it 
really solve the problems? (2019) 42 Revista Derecho del Estado, 83-
115 <http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0122-
98932019000100083> accessed 15 December 2019 
3. Christoph Schreuer,, ‘Interaction of International Tribunals and Domestic Courts 
in Investment Law’, (2011) University of Vienna Wordpress 
<https://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/interactions_int_tribunals_do
mestic.pdf Accessed on 5/1/2020> accessed 12 December 2019 
4. Crina Baltag, and Cristen Bauer ,‘An Update on the ISDS Reform: the 37th Session 
of the UNCITRAL Working Group III Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform’, 
(2019) Kluwer Arbitration Blog 
<http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/05/02/an-update-on-the-
isds-reform-the-37th-session-of-the-uncitral-working-group-iii-investor-state-
dispute-settlement-reform/> accessed 5 January 2020 
5. Deyan Dragiev, ‘ 2018 in Review: The Achmea Decision and Its Reverberations in 
the World of Arbitration’ (2019) Kluwer Arbitration Blog 
<http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/01/16/2018-in-review-the-
achmea-decision-and-its-reverberations-in-the-world-of-arbitration/> accessed 
23 December 2019 
6. Guillaume Croisant , ‘Micula Case: The General Court Quashes the Commission’s 
Decision and Rules that the Award is Not State Aid’, (2019) Kluwer Arbitration 
Blog <http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/06/19/micula-case-
the-general-court-quashes-the-commissions-decision-and-rules-that-the-award-
is-not-state-aid/> accessed 4 December 2019  
   
43 
 
7. Hannes Lenk, ‘An Investment Court System for the New Generation of EU Trade 
and Investment Agreements’, (2016) European Papers 
<http://www.europeanpapers.eu/en/europeanforum/investment-court-system-
new-generation-eu-trade-and-investment-agreements> accessed on 5 January 
2020 
8. Kenneth J Vandevelde, ‘A Brief History of International Investment Agreements’ 
(2005) 12 (1) U.C. Davis Journal of International Law & Policy 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1478757> accessed 14 
November 2019 
9. Maximilian Clasmeier, ‘Investment Arbitration and Legal Protection Under 
European Law – Frankfurt Court Strengthens the Efficiency of Arbitration 
Agreements’, (2015) Kluwer Arbitration Blog 
<http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/03/11/investment-
arbitration-and-legal-protection-under-european-law-frankfurt-court-
strengthens-the-efficiency-of-arbitration-agreements/> accessed 16 December 
2019 
10. Osborne Clarke Robert Hunter, Greg Fullelove and Michelle Radom, ‘End of the 
road for intra-EU BITs’, (2019) Lexology 
<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=37642ef4-0daf-417d-898a-
dddff45556b5> accessed 3 January 2019  
11. Quentin Decleve, ‘EU Commission Appeals EU General Court’s Judgment in 
Micula’ (2019) International Litigation Blog <http://international-litigation-
blog.com/eu-commission-appeals-eu-general-courts-judgment-in-micula/>  
accessed 4 December 2019 
12. Richard Allen, ‘Eureka! Advocate General blasts European Commission on the 
validity of intra-EU investment treaties’ (2017) Global Arbitration News 
<https://globalarbitrationnews.com/intra-eu-bit-20170921/#_ftn5> accessed 3 
January 2020 
13. Richard Power, ‘The (Final?) Death of Intra-EU Investor-State Arbitration’, (2019) 
Kluwer Arbitration Blog 
   
44 
 
<http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/01/28/the-final-death-of-
intra-eu-investor-state-arbitration/> accessed 03 January 2020 
14. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investment 
Dispute Settlement Navigator (2019) 
<https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement> accessed 
15 December 2019 
15. Wolfgang Koeth, ‘Can the Investment Court System (ICS) save TTIP and 
CETA?’(2016) European Institute of Public Administration, Working Papers, 7 
<https://www.eipa.eu/wpontent/uploads/2017/11/20161019072755_Workingp
aper2016_W_01.pdf > accessed 5 January 2020  
Press Release 
1.  C‑284/16,  Slovak Republic v Achmea BV (2018) CL – 181  Opinion of AG 
Wathelet 
2. 1/17 Opinion of Advocate General Bot (2019)  
3. European Commission, ‘Commission asks Member States to terminate their 
intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties’, 10 June 2015  
4. Commission, ‘Protection of Intra EU Investment’, COM (2018) 547 final, 19 July 
2018 
5. Declaration of the Member States of 15 January 2019 on the legal consequences 
of the Achmea judgment and on investment protection’ (2019) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/190117-bilateral-investment-
treaties_en> accessed 11 November 2019 
6. Declaration of the Representative of the Government of Hungary of 16 January 
2019 on the legal consequences of the Judgment of the Court of Justice in 
Achmea and on Investment Protection in the European Union (2019) 
https://www.kormany.hu/download/5/1b/81000/Hungarys%20Declaration%20o
n%20Achmea.pdf accessed 16 November 2019 
7. Declaration of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States of 
16 January 2019 on the Enforcement of the Judgment of the Court of Justice in 
Achmea and on Investment Protection in the European Union (2019) 
   
45 
 
<https://www.regeringen.se/48ee19/contentassets/d759689c0c804a9ea7af6b2
de7320128/achmea-declaration.pdf > accessed 3 January 2020 
8. Micula v. Romania ICSID CASE NO. ARB/05/20, Commission Decision (EU 
2015/1470) L 232/43 
9. European Commission Statement, ‘EU Member States agree on a plurilateral 
treaty to terminate bilateral investment treaties’ (2019) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_an
d_finance/documents/191024-bilateral-investment-treaties_en.pdf> accessed 4 
January 2020 
10. European Commission, ‘Discussion on Investment in TTIP at the Meeting of the 
International Trade Committee of the European Parliament’ (2015) 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_sPEECH-15-4624_en.htm>  accessed 21 
December 2019 
11. European Commission, ‘Why the new EU proposal for an Investment Court 
System in TTIP is beneficial to both States and investors’ (2015) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_15_6060> 
accessed 23 December 2019 
12. Minister Reynders submits request for opinion on CETA (2017) 
https://diplomatie.belgium.be/en/newsroom/news/2017/minister_reynders_su
bmits_request_opinion_ceta accessed 22 December 2019  
Websites 
1. European Union (https://europa.eu/) 
<https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-
countries/slovakia_en> accessed 30 November 2019 
2. International Renewable Energy Agency (https://irena.org/) 
 <https://www.irena.org/europe> accessed 23 December 2019 
3. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investment 
Hub (https://unctad.org/) 
<https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-
agreements/treaties/bit/1212/czech-republic---netherlands-bit-1991-> accessed 
30 November 2019 
   
46 
 
4. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investment 
Hub, (https://unctad.org/)  <https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-
investment-agreements accessed 3 December 2019 
5. U.S. Agency for International Development, For American People, ‘Natural Gas 
Value Chain: Pipeline Transportation’ (https://sari-energy.org/) < https://sari-
energy.org/oldsite/PageFiles/What_We_Do/activities/GEMTP/CEE_NATURAL_G
AS_VALUE_CHAIN.pdf> accessed 14 December 2019 
